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ARANSAS PROJECT V. SHAW: THE FIFTH CIRCUIT’S
INCORRECT AND ATTENUATED PROXIMATE CAUSE
ANALYSIS ON WHAT KILLED THE WHOOPING CRANE
BRIAN REAGAN*
INTRODUCTION
“Back from the brink, North America’s Whooping Crane is a sym-
bol of hope for endangered species. Recovering from a low of only 22 birds
in the wild in the 1940s to around 599 birds today, the whooping crane’s
recovery is one of conservation’s most inspiring success stories.”1 The
world’s only wild population of whooping cranes breeds in the Wood
Buffalo National Park of Canada, and winters in and near the Aransas
National Wildlife Refuge (“ANWR”) in Texas.2 While wintering, the whoop-
ing cranes stay on the ANWR’s coastal wetlands, near San Antonio Bay,
which are fed freshwater by the Guadalupe River.3 At the start of the
2008–2009 winter season the flock numbered around 270 birds but over
the course of that winter an unusually large amount, 23, of the whooping
cranes died.4 This “record-breaking death toll” led to The Aransas Project’s
(“TAP”) formation.5 TAP’s goal is to protect the wetlands and ensure they
receive enough freshwater by promoting responsible water use.6
In Texas, the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality
(“TCEQ”) regulates the use and capture of freshwater.7 Due to excessive
use of Guadalupe River water, use that requires permits from the TCEQ,
the freshwater entering the wetlands decreased. As this happened, water
* J.D. Candidate, William & Mary Law School, 2016; B.A. European History and Inter-
national Relations, Boston University, 2011. The author would like to thank his family,
friends, and the William & Mary Environmental Law & Policy Review staff.
1 Whooping Crane Conservation, INT’L CRANE FOUND. (on file with the author).
2 THE WORLD CONSERVATION UNION, STATUS SURVEY AND CONSERVATION ACTION PLAN:
THE CRANES, 172 https://portals.iucn.org/library/efiles/documents/1996-022.pdf [https://
perma.cc/5TB9-N4SQ].
3 Guadalupe Conservation Story, INT’L CRANE FOUND., https://www.savingcranes.org/guada
lupe-conservation-story/ [https://perma.cc/2R6L-MH3D] (last visited Mar. 27, 2016).
4 Aransas Project v. Shaw, 930 F. Supp. 2d 716, 724 (S.D. Tex. 2013).
5 About the Aransas Project, THE ARKANSAS PROJECT, http://thearansasproject.org/about/
[https://perma.cc/A95Z-D2C8] (last visited Mar. 27, 2016).
6 Id.
7 Aransas Project, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 725.
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salinity levels throughout the ANWR increased.8 TAP believes that the
increased salinity levels led to the cranes’ deaths and sued the TCEQ
under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) for an illegal taking.9
The ESA states that it is illegal for any person to take any endan-
gered species.10 Take “means to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound,
kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct.”11
TAP argued that the high salinity levels modified the whooping cranes’
habitat enough that it qualified as a take.12 The U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of Texas held in favor of TAP and found that the
TCEQ’s use of water permits satisfied the elements for a taking.13 TCEQ
appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed in
favor of TCEQ, finding that the TCEQ’s water permits did not proxi-
mately cause the whooping cranes’ deaths.14
This Note argues that the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
used an improper proximate cause analysis and overextended the chain
of events that led to the cranes’ deaths, which caused the court to incor-
rectly hold that the TCEQ did not take the cranes. Part I of the Note
discusses the history and purpose of the ESA, how proximate cause is
analyzed in the court system under the ESA, and the different analyses
the district court and the court of appeals used in Aransas Project v.
Shaw. Part II examines the court of appeal’s proximate cause test and
analyzes how this will negatively affect future taking claims. Part III
explains why the district court’s proximate cause test was correct.
I. THE ESA, TAKINGS, AND PROXIMATE CAUSE ANALYSIS
IN THE COURTS
This Part provides a background on the history and purpose of the
ESA, as well as the definitions involved in the takings provision. Addi-
tionally, it examines these definitions through Supreme Court cases that
helped shape takings law and also analyzes the importance of proximate
cause in these cases. Lastly, this Part examines both the district court’s




10 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2012).
11 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2012).
12 Aransas Project v. Shaw, 930 F. Supp. 2d 716, 725 (S.D. Tex. 2013).
13 Id.
14 Aransas Project v. Shaw, 775 F.3d 641, 645 (5th Cir. 2014).
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A. The ESA and “Harm”
With rising concerns that many of the United States’ native
plants and animals were going extinct, Congress passed the Endangered
Species Act in 1973.15 Section 1531 of Title 16, Chapter 35 of the U.S.
Code clearly states Congress’ purpose for the ESA: “[T]o provide a means
whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened
species depend may be conserved . . . and to take such steps as may be
appropriate to achieve the purposes of [the act].”16 The ESA provides five
criteria to judge whether a species should be listed as endangered or
threatened.17 Under these criteria, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Services
(“FWS”) listed the whooping crane as endangered in 1967, which pro-
vided the whooping cranes with full protection under the act.18
This protection includes making it illegal for any person to take
a whooping crane.19 Take, as described above, includes the word “harm”
in its definition.20 Harm is further defined in the Code of Federal Regula-
tions as “an act which actually kills or injures wildlife. Such act may
include significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually
kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral
patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering.”21
The FWS codified this definition in response to Palila v. Hawaii
Department of Land & Natural Resources.22 The FWS feared that Palila,
in combination with the old definition of harm, could imply that habitat
modification alone would be a taking.23 In order to remedy this, the FWS
changed the definition to the one above and stressed that the modifica-
tion or degradation “must be significant, must significantly impair essen-
tial behavioral patterns, and must result in actual injury.”24 Today, there
15 40 Years of Conserving Endangered Species, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. (Jan. 2013),
http://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/ESA_basics.pdf [https://perma.cc/T4JA
-GBKG].
16 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2012).
17 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(1).
18 Whooping Crane (Grus americana), U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., https://ecos.fws.gov
/tess_public/profile/speciesProfile.action?spcode=B003 [https://perma.cc/9HGG-5NCW]
(last visited Mar. 27, 2016).
19 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B).
20 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19).
21 50 C.F.R. § 17.3(c) (2014).
22 Steven G. Davison, Alteration of Wildlife Habitat as a Prohibited Taking Under the
Endangered Species Act, 10 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 155, 184–85 (1995).
23 Id.
24 46 Fed. Reg. 54750 (1981).
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are more recent court decisions that further explain the take prohibition
of the ESA and the definition of harm.
B. Habitat Modification and Proximate Cause
1. Court’s Analysis in Sweet Home
In 1995, the Supreme Court decided Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chap-
ter of Communities for a Great Oregon.25 Sweet Home, the respondents,
was a combination of people and companies that depended on forest
products industries.26 They brought this case against the Secretary of the
Interior and the Director of the FWS to challenge the regulation that
defined “harm,” specifically the part referring to habitat modification and
degradation.27 The respondents challenged this regulation on the basis
that, as it applied to the red-cockaded woodpecker and the northern
spotted owl, it had hurt them economically.28
The Supreme Court held that the interpretation by the FWS to
include significant habitat modification in the definition of harm was
reasonable.29 The Court supported this decision with three reasons.30
First, the Court looked at the plain definition of harm and found that the
definition “naturally encompasse[d] habitat modification.”31 The Court
further supported this argument by stating that the definition did not
use the word “directly.”32 Next the court examined the ESA’s purpose and
found that its comprehensive nature clearly includes the definition stated
by the FWS.33 Lastly, the Court discussed the fact that the Secretary of
the Interior can issue permits for takings.34 The Court stated that since
the act provides permits “if such taking is incidental to, and not the
purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity,”35 Congress
meant for the ESA “to prohibit indirect as well as deliberate takings.”36
25 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
26 Id. at 692.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 708.
30 Id. at 697.
31 Babbitt, 515 U.S. at 697.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 698.
34 Id. at 700.
35 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (2012).
36 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 700 (1995).
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While the Court in Sweet Home clearly stated and supported the
definition of harm, the Court’s opinion on causation in regards to a taking
was unclear.37 The majority opinion only mentioned proximate cause
briefly to state that “ordinary requirements of proximate causation and
foreseeability” are necessary to knowingly violate the act.38 The concur-
ring and dissenting opinions, however, provided some insight into the
Court’s thoughts on proximate cause.39
Justice O’Connor stated that liability should only be found if
habitat modification proximately causes death or injury.40 She went on
to provide two examples of a taking to illustrate when proximate cause
would and would not be found, at least according to her: “The farmer
whose fertilizer is lifted by a tornado from tilled fields and deposited
miles away in a wildlife refuge cannot . . . be considered the proximate
cause . . . . [The] landowner who drains a pond on his property, killing
endangered fish in the process,” would be the proximate cause.41 Justice
O’Connor further elaborated that the principle is used to eliminate the
bizarre, that it is similar to foreseeability, and that considerations of the
fairness of imposing liability should be taken into account.42 She ended
her examination by stating that the “‘harm’ regulation applies where
significant habitat modification, by impairing essential behaviors, proxi-
mately (foreseeably) causes actual death or injury.”43
2. Sweet Home in Conjunction with Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife
The Supreme Court decided Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife three
years before they would hear Sweet Home. Looking back at Lujan in light
of Sweet Home helps illuminate the notion of proximate cause in regards
to ESA takings.44 Lujan concerned environmental groups bringing an
action to force the FWS to comply with the ESA abroad.45 The Supreme
Court found that the plaintiffs did not have standing because they did
not state a sufficiently imminent injury.46 Five of the sitting justices
37 Duane J. Desiderio, Sweet Home on the Range: A Model for As-Applied Challenges to
the “Harm” Regulation, 3 ENVTL. L. 725, 739–44 (1997).
38 Babbitt, 515 U.S. at 696, n.9.
39 Id. at 713 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
40 Id. at 712.
41 Id. at 713.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Desiderio, supra note 37, at 763.
45 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
46 Id. at 556.
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agreed that an imminent injury requires at least the threat of a real and
immediate harm.47
An examination of this holding in conjunction with the proximate
cause analysis in Sweet Home reveals that most likely the Supreme Court
would require that injury or death caused by habitat modifications must
be foreseeable.48 In light of Lujan, foreseeability is satisfied when an
imminent injury that is certain to occur will injure a species.49
C. Aransas Project v. Shaw: District Court
As discussed in the Introduction, TAP brought the TCEQ to court
for illegal takings of the whooping cranes in the ANWR. In support of its
case, TAP brought in multiple expert witnesses and documents to show
that the high salinity levels were the cause of the cranes’ deaths.50 TAP
used this information to show that the water management practice of the
TCEQ drastically modified the cranes’ habitat.51 TAP explained that the
ANWR receives freshwater inflows from the Guadalupe and San Antonio
Rivers, and that the excessive water use allowed by TCEQ permits
decreased this inflow and raised the salinity levels of the water.52
In support of these claims, TAP entered exhibit PX-90 into evi-
dence.53 PX-90 provided an average of the salinity levels across the
ANWR from 1987–2009.54 This exhibit showed that for the 2008–2009
winter the San Antonio Bay had salinities greater than 25 parts per
trillion (“ppt”).55 Additionally, this information illustrated that when
freshwater inflow was low and bay salinities high, the cranes always had
a high mortality percentage.56 Reasoning from this data, it can be con-
cluded that cranes have a higher mortality rate when the saline levels
are higher.57 It is important to note that these findings only confirmed
what multiple crane organizations had observed and warned about.58
47 Desiderio, supra note 37, at 762.
48 Id. at 763.
49 Id. at 764.
50 Aransas Project v. Shaw, 930 F. Supp. 2d. 716, 725, 744 (S.D. Tex. 2013).
51 Id. at 725.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 746.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 See Aransas Project, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 724, 746 (listing the average salinity levels as
4.3%, 3.4%, and 7.8%, all lower than the 8.5% of the 2008–2009 winter).
57 Id.
58 Id. at 747.
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TAP also hired crane experts to testify about the cranes’ habits and
preferences.59 These experts found that when the freshwater inflow was
not impeded, barely any cranes died; however, when that inflow decreased,
crane deaths spiked.60 The experts also testified that blue crabs and
wolfberries are the most important food to the whooping cranes.61 They
further testified that without those staples a crane would expend more
energy than it could ingest.62 During the 2008–2009 winter both blue
crabs and wolfberries were extremely scarce.63 The experts also noted
that during this winter they observed the cranes acting out of character,
such as a parent acting aggressive when a baby approached, a trait that
is typical of food stress.64 Lastly, experts noted that when salinity levels
reached 15 ppt the cranes began to fly to different sources of freshwater and
that by the time the salinity levels reached 23 ppt all of the cranes left.65
Based on these facts the district court found the TCEQ liable for
the cranes’ deaths.66 With regards to proximate cause, the district court
only mentioned it to state that its ordinary requirements apply and that
“proximate causation exists where a defendant government agency au-
thorized the activity that caused the take.”67 The court, however, as illus-
trated above, discussed in great detail the cause through the evidence
provided by TAP, beginning with the issuance of water permits and ending
with the whooping cranes’ deaths.68
D. Aransas Project v. Shaw: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
TCEQ quickly appealed the district court’s decision and the court
of appeals reversed the lower court.69 The court stated that the lower
court barely discussed proximate cause or any of its required concepts, such
as “remoteness, attenuation, or the natural and probable consequences
of actions.”70 The court then continued to discuss its own version of proxi-
mate cause.71
59 Id. at 764.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Aransas Project, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 765.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 766.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 786.
68 Aransas Project, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 786.
69 Aransas Project v. Shaw, 775 F.3d 641, 645 (5th Cir. 2014).
70 Id. at 658.
71 Id. at 659.
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The court of appeals mentioned and relied on the example from
Sweet Home about a farmer draining a pond and stated that this example
is “the limited, albeit not definitive, Sweet Home conception of an ‘indi-
rect’ taking.”72 The court of appeals continued to analyze every piece of
the evidence provided in the original court case that was linked to the
cranes’ deaths.73 In doing this the court looked at the start as the issuing
of the water permits and the end of it as the cranes’ deaths. The court
stated their chain of causation as follows:
TAP asserted that the state defendants’ water permitting
and regulatory practices had led to private parties’ with-
drawing water from the San Antonio and Guadalupe Rivers,
in turn leading to a significant reduction in freshwater in-
flow into the San Antonio Bay ecosystem. That reduction
in fresh-water inflow, coupled with a drought, led to in-
creased salinity in the bay, which decreased the availability
of drinkable water and caused a reduction in the abundance
of blue crabs and wolfberries, two of the cranes’ staple
foods. According to TAP, that caused the cranes to become
emaciated and to engage in stress behavior, such as deny-
ing food to juveniles and flying farther afield in search of
food, leading to further emaciation and increased preda-
tion. Ultimately this chain of events led to the deaths of
twenty-three cranes during the winter of 2008–2009.74
Based on the events stated this way, the court of appeals found that
proximate cause did not exist and that the injury was not foreseeable and
therefore overturned the district court’s decision.75
Discussing the issue of foreseeability, the Fifth Circuit brought up
the 2007 United States Fish and Wildlife Service International Whoop-
ing Crane Recovery Plan.76 The court then discussed select paragraphs
and phrases to support their idea that the TCEQ could never have fore-
seen an increase in whooping crane deaths caused by a decrease in fresh-
water inflows from water permit use.77 The Fifth Circuit highlighted
72 Id.
73 Id. at 660.
74 Id. at 646–47.
75 Aransas Project, 775 F.3d at 646–47.
76 Id.
77 Id.
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phrases and words used in the report such as “predicted,” “at times,” and
“[u]ncertainty remains concerning possible long-term declines . . . .”78 The
Fifth Circuit analyzed this 150-page report in about a page of their opin-
ion and concluded that TCEQ could not anticipate a “significant die-off”
due to increased salinity.79
Continuing the discussion of foreseeability, the court stated that
the TCEQ could not predict the cranes’ deaths because of the number of
contingencies in the chain of causation.80 The court started this discus-
sion by mentioning that the state does not directly control the water
usage but rather the landowners regulate their own usage, subject to a
permit that the state grants.81 The court further supported its opinion by
noting that salinity levels are also affected by natural forces.82 Then the
court discussed the fact that as salinity levels rise, it is harder for the
whooping crane to find food sources in the “critical habitat of the [ ]
cranes.”83 Lastly, it mentioned that the lack of food could also be attrib-
uted to natural forces.84 Ending their analysis of proximate cause, the
Fifth Circuit likened the Aransas situation to a hypothetical in the Exxon
Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc. case, “in which a vessel colliding with a bridge
should not be held liable for the death of a patient whose doctor arrived
late because of the bridge closing.”85
II. THE INCORRECT AND ATTENUATED ANALYSIS OF PROXIMATE
CAUSE BY THE FIFTH CIRCUIT IN ARANSAS PROJECT V. SHAW 2
This Part examines the Fifth Circuit’s proximate cause analysis
and discusses its importance. Additionally, it explains that the Fifth
Circuit incorrectly focused on the proximate cause of the cranes’ deaths
instead of the proximate cause of the habitat modification, which caused
an indirect taking. Following this explanation, this Part discusses if the
TCEQ could have foreseen that significant habitat modification would
occur. Lastly, this Part discusses the possible impact this decision could
have on future takings claims under the ESA.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 662.




85 Id. at 663.
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A. An In-Depth Examination of the Fifth Circuit’s Proximate
Cause Analysis
1. Habitat Modification and the Fifth Circuit’s Proximate
Cause Analysis
In TVA v. Hill, the Supreme Court first held that the intent of
Congress with the ESA “was to halt and reverse the trend toward species
extinction, whatever the cost.”86 Sweet Home followed from this precedent
and the Supreme Court upheld the definition of “harm” as it is stated in
the takings provision.87 Therefore, a taking occurs when significant
habitat modification actually kills or injures a protected species.88 This
point is reiterated because the Fifth Circuit’s decision seemed to ignore
the significant habitat modification provision and instead focused their
entire proximate cause analysis on whether or not the cranes’ deaths
were proximately caused by the TCEQ issuing water permits.89
The Fifth Circuit succinctly stated their proximate cause analy-
sis.90 They began this analysis with, “TAP asserted that the state defen-
dants’ water permitting and regulatory practices had led to private parties’
withdrawing water from the San Antonio and Guadalupe Rivers, in turn
leading to a significant reduction in freshwater inflow into the San
Antonio Bay ecosystem.”91 The Fifth Circuit then continued by focusing
on every minute detail that was affected by the reduction of freshwater
inflow and how all these factors in turn led to the cranes’ deaths.92 Under
the ESA, and confirmed by Sweet Home, however, all that is necessary
for a taking is that an endangered species is harmed.93 Once again, for
a species to be considered “harmed,” there must be “significant habitat
modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by
significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding,
feeding or sheltering.”94
In the first sentences of its analysis, the Fifth Circuit acknowl-
edged that the water permitting and regulatory practices by the TCEQ
86 Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978) (emphasis added).
87 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
88 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b).
89 Aransas Project v. Shaw, 775 F.3d 641, 657–60 (5th Cir. 2014).
90 Id. at 646–47.
91 Id. at 646.
92 Id. at 646–47.
93 16 U.S.C. § 1538.
94 Aransas Project, 775 F.3d at 646 (emphasis added).
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significantly reduced the freshwater inflow into the San Antonio Bay eco-
system.95 The court then provided numerous examples of how the habitat
was significantly affected, such as: the increase in salinity, the decrease
in available drinking water, and the reduction of blue crabs and wolf-
berries.96 Because of all these habitat modifications, the whooping cranes
had to fly further and further to find food.97 Because they had to fly fur-
ther they had to expend more energy and had less energy intake.98 This
led to food stress and food guarding and resulted in cranes dying.99 Based
on these observations, the decrease in freshwater clearly affected the
sheltering and feeding habits of the whooping cranes.
Despite this evidence, the Fifth Circuit found that there was no
proximate cause; they based this on an unnecessary causation chain they
created when under the ESA, all the Court had to find was that the permits
proximately caused a significant habitat modification that led to the actual
death of the whooping cranes.100 The Court in Sweet Home “exemplifies
the Supreme Court’s willingness to defer to agency expertise and the
ESA’s broad delegation of authority.”101 Further, the Sweet Home deci-
sion made a statement that the court was willing to enforce and promote
the ESA by “affording threatened and endangered species and their
critical habitats the ultimate protection under the law . . . .”102 By drawing
out this long chain of causation and attributing each factor to the subse-
quent one and the eventual death of the cranes, the Fifth Circuit ignored
the legislative and judicial history of the ESA takings provision.103
2. Water Permits and the Issue of Foreseeability
The Fifth Circuit held that the TCEQ did not proximately cause
the whooping cranes’ deaths because the chain was too tenuous.104 The
95 See id.
96 Id. at 646–47.
97 Aransas Project v. Shaw, 930 F. Supp. 2d 716, 766 (S.D. Tex. 2013).
98 Id. at 765.
99 Id. at 724.
100 16 U.S.C. § 1538; Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S.
687 (1995).
101 Shelli L. Iovino, Habitat Modification and ESA Takings under Babbitt v. Sweet Home
Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 7 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 481, 502 (1996).
102 Id. (emphasis added).
103 Id. at 501.
104 Aransas Project v. Shaw, 775 F.3d 641, 660 (5th Cir. 2014).
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analysis did not stop there, however: the Fifth Circuit went on to analyze
whether or not the TCEQ could foresee that an increase in water permits
would lead to the cranes’ deaths.105 Again, the Fifth Circuit looked over
this information in a simple manner and based their decision on a selec-
tive reading of the International Recovery Plan for the Whooping Crane
(“IRPWC”).106 The Fifth Circuit claimed that the lower court found that
the TCEQ could foresee the death “because a 2007 United States Fish
and Wildlife Service International Whooping Crane Recovery Plan noted
that ‘[u]pstream reservoir construction and water diversions for agricul-
ture and human use reduce freshwater flows.’ ”107
The IRPWC is a 125-page document that discussed, in extreme
detail, the background of the whooping cranes, their habits, their habitat
requirements, and threats to their habitat.108 The Fifth Circuit high-
lighted specific portions of the report to prove their conclusion, that the
whooping cranes’ deaths were unforeseeable.109 The Fifth Circuit also
stated that the report “includes numerous non-specific, conditional, pre-
dictive statements not quoted by the district court.”110 The Court contin-
ued then to highlight only those “non-specific, conditional, predictive
statements,” and ignored the many statements that are supported by
evidence and conclusive in nature.111
The Fifth Circuit highlighted three particular passages from the
IRPWC in an attempt to show that the IRPWC only believed that inflows
will be a problem in the future or are not always the problem.112 The court
then summarized those examples into the statement: “decreased fresh-
water inflows ‘at times’ have been ‘insufficient,’ and in future decades the
105 Id.
106 Id. at 661.
107 Id.
108 See generally U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., INTERNATIONAL RECOVERY PLAN FOR THE
WHOOPING CRANE (3rd Revision, 2006) [hereinafter IRPWC].
109 Aransas Project, 775 F.3d at 661.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 See id. (stating, “[w]ithdrawals of surface and groundwater for municipal and in-
dustrial growth are predicted to leave insufficient inflows to sustain the ecosystem in less
than 50 years. . . .;” “[i]nflows are already at times insufficient and reduced over historic
levels, leading to increases in mean salinity and decreases in blue crabs. . . . Long before
ecosystem collapse, due to lack of inflows, significant adverse impacts to blue crab popu-
lations would occur. . . .;” and, “[w]inter habitats at Aransas are presently sufficient to
support at least 500 individuals. . . . Uncertainty remains concerning possible long-term
declines in ecosystems used by the cranes as a consequence of expanding human popu-
lations and their demands for fresh water. . . .”).
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decline may affect the bay’s ecosystem.”113 Then it concluded that the three
statements it cherry-picked out of the 125-page report and the court’s
summarization of it do not establish foreseeability.114
Discussing freshwater inflows, the authors of the IRPWC stated
that expanding human populations have a particularly severe impact on
the wintering grounds.115 The report continued to specifically mention
the Guadalupe and San Antonio Rivers and that inflow from those rivers
“are needed to maintain proper salinity gradients . . . that produce an
ecologically healthy estuary.”116 Additionally, in the outline for the recovery
plan, the authors explicitly stated that maintaining freshwater inflows
into the ANWR is a priority because of their impact on the whooping
cranes’ critical habitat.117 The IRPWC then highlighted the significance
of freshwater inflows by stating that they are essential to the productivity
of the coastal waters used by the whooping cranes as well as to produce
foods used by the whooping cranes. Lastly, the Texas Parks and Wildlife
Department (“TPWD”) recommended target freshwater inflow levels needed
to maintain the Guadalupe Estuary in 1998.118
These levels were criticized, however, and in 2003, when the San
Marcos River Foundation applied for a water right in accordance with
the levels, they were denied.119 The foundation appealed the denial and
in 2005, the court sent the application back to the TCEQ.120 This shows
that at least as early as 2005, the TCEQ was aware of the freshwater
inflow situation and its importance to the biological communities in the
area.121 This report made it clear that freshwater inflows were not only
important to the critical habitat of the cranes but essential to the whoop-
ing cranes’ survival. Additionally, based on the observations stated in the
report that the TCEQ was aware of, it is foreseeable that TCEQ permit-
ting would lead to crane deaths, because the permitting significantly
modified the cranes’ habitat.122
The Fifth Circuit concluded its analysis of foreseeability by stating
“[c]ontingencies concerning permittees’ and others’ water use, the forces
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 IRPWC, supra note 108, at 20.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 50.
118 Id. at 20.
119 Id. at 20–21.
120 Id. at 21.
121 IRPWC, supra note 108, at 21.
122 See generally id.
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of nature, and the availability of particular foods to whooping cranes
demonstrate that only a fortuitous confluence of adverse factors caused
the unexpected 2008–2009 die off . . .”123 This statement did make much
sense in light of the IRPWC’s existence, which clearly demonstrated the
necessity of freshwater inflows for the crane’s survival.124 There was not
a “fortuitous confluence of adverse factors,” but rather an increase in
water permits and usage that directly affected the bay’s salinity and
therefore significantly modified the whooping cranes’ habitat.125
At the end of the opinion the court of appeals claimed that the
death of the whooping cranes is similar to a patient dying because a
vessel collided with a bridge, closing the bridge down thus making the
doctor arrive too late to the patient.126 Broken down, the doctor example
is simply a patient dying because the doctor arrived late due to an un-
foreseen circumstance. This situation is more analogous to a situation
where either the TCEQ did not know the whooping cranes were in the
area or did not realize that an increase in permits would increase the
salinity and then the whooping cranes died. Here, though, as was proven
in the report and in the district court, the TCEQ knew that whooping
cranes wintered in the area, that the area was supplied by freshwater from
the San Antonio and Guadalupe rivers, and that the permits were increas-
ing the salinity, and which was dangerous for the whooping cranes.127
Therefore, a doctor example that actually parallels the situation
here would involve a doctor that is forewarned certain roads or bridges
are going to be closed and then takes those roads anyway to get to the
patient, only to have the patient die because the doctor arrived late. In
that circumstance the patient’s death is foreseeable because the doctor
knew he would not arrive on time because he knew the roads were closed
yet took them anyway.
B. Illustrating the Effect of the Aransas Proximate Cause Analysis
by Looking at Past ESA Takings Cases
The Fifth Circuit supported a criticism that the issuing of permits
to take water is comparable to a state being held liable for drivers who
run over endangered species because they issue driver’s licenses.128 This
123 Aransas Project v. Shaw, 775 F.3d 641, 662 (5th Cir. 2014).
124 IRPWC, supra note 108, at 20.
125 Aransas Project, 775 F.3d at 662.
126 Id. at 663.
127 See generally id.
128 Id. at 659.
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is notable because a similar comparison was drawn by the defendant in
Strahan v. Coxe, an ESA takings case.129 In Strahan, the defendant
stated that if a permit to set lobster traps could be part of proximate
cause then it is the same as saying the “licensure of automobiles and
drivers solicits or causes federal crimes . . .”130 The court responded that
while a licensed driver could use the license to break the law, it is impos-
sible for a licensed commercial fishing operation to use its lobster trap
without the risk of violating the ESA.131 This analysis is the correct way
to think about it, and the Aransas court missed this point.
If the Strahan court had used the same analysis that the Aransas
court used then it would have had to find that there was no proximate
cause between the licensing of the lobster traps and the taking of right
whales. An Aransas interpretation of Strahan would look something like
this: (1) Fishermen request license to set up lobster traps, (2) Fisherman
receive license, (3) Fishermen set up lobster traps, (4) right whales are hurt
by lobster traps. This analysis is much more attenuated and more likely
to fail than if they had just followed the Strahan analysis which, summa-
rized, looks more like this: (1) Fisherman receive license and (2) right
whales are hurt.132 The Aransas proximate cause analysis just weakened
the analysis that goes into proximate cause and foreseeability by making
it more attenuated.
Other earlier cases would also be affected by this analysis despite
clearly being ESA takings. An example of this is Sierra Club v. Yeutter,
where red-cockaded woodpeckers were harmed by the Forest Service’s
timber management policies.133 The Court found that the Forest Service
committed a take of the red-cockaded woodpeckers because they practiced
clear-cutting within two hundred feet of trees in which red-cockaded wood-
peckers inhabited and did not remove midstory hardwood, which led the
red-cockaded woodpeckers to abandon certain trees.134 Since these prac-
tices modified the red-cockaded woodpeckers’ habitat, the court ruled
that it was a taking.135
Analyzing Sierra Club under Aransas could result in a different
holding. The court of Aransas would more likely see the proximate cause
analysis like this: (1) Forest Service cuts down trees, (2) the amount of
129 Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 164 (1st Cir. 1997).
130 Id. at 163–64.
131 Id. at 165.
132 Id. at 164.
133 Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429, 432 (5th Cir. 1991).
134 Id. at 438.
135 Id.
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trees over 100 years old is reduced, (3) midstory hardwood is not cleared,
(4) decrease in 100+ year old trees means the Southern pine beetle is living
in more of the old growth pines, (5) red-cockaded woodpecker has to fly
further for shelter/cannot find shelter. Looking at the Aransas analysis
in this case illustrates how easy it is to attenuate proximate cause in
order to come to the desired result. If the chain of events from Aransas
does not satisfy proximate cause then the chain of events above also should
not and therefore Sierra Club would have a different result if the Sierra
Club court used the Aransas court’s analysis.
These two cases illustrate the effects that the Aransas proximate
cause analysis could have on future takings claims. By stretching out the
chain of causation from the original act to the harm of the endangered
species it clearly becomes harder to find proximate cause. The above two
examples are also more direct in the way the species’ habitat is modified,
at least compared to the whooping crane, however, it still becomes hard to
find proximate cause. This type of analysis essentially makes it extremely
difficult for a taking to occur when there is a habitat modification involved
because the defendant can always muddy the waters with many other
factors. This is important to note because of the many endangered water
species in the Southwest and the Southwestern states’ problem with water.
C. Weakening the Habitat Modification Aspect Will Have
Serious Effects on the Endangered Species that Inhabit
Western Waters
The West is an arid region in the United States.136 As the human
population grows, naturally the demand for water also grows.137 Aquifers,
dams, river diversions, and plumbing redistribution systems are just
some of the ways that the West is handling this increased demand for
water.138 All of these solutions, however, divert water from other water
sources and have an effect on the ecosystem in those areas.139 Besides
having a scarcity of water, or perhaps because of it, the West also has quite
a few endangered species living in those same waters.140 Many Western
states have already faced ESA takings claims due to the divided pressure
136 Holly Doremus, Water, Population Growth, and Endangered Species in the West, 72
U. COLO. L. REV. 361, 362 (2001).
137 Id. at 363–64.
138 Id. at 369–72.
139 Id. at 371.
140 Id. at 369–72.
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from needing water to support the urban population and needing water
to support endangered species’ habitats.141
Many articles have been written about the battles Western states
may have or have had with environmental groups because of the scarcity
of water. These articles all illustrate the worry that these states have
about possible takings claims being successful due to the habitat modi-
fication confirmation in Sweet Home.142 One example of this is the Ed-
wards Aquifer, the sole aquifer to supply San Antonio with its water.143
Because the Edwards Aquifer is the sole supplier to San Antonio, heavy
demands have been placed upon it, which is beginning to greatly affect
the San Marcos and Comal Spring systems, which are home to a unique
aquatic ecosystem.144
Holly Doremus, in her article, noted that “diminished spring flows,
together with urbanization, recreational water uses, pollution, and intro-
duction of exotic species,” all threaten the springs.145 By mentioning all
these aspects threatening the aquifer, it is reasonable to believe that a
court following the Aransas decision could list all those other reasons for
the proximate cause or at least state that they make proximate cause too
attenuated, even if the large supply of water is truly affecting the endan-
gered species habitat, therefore modifying it.
Another example of concern for Western states is in the Pacific
Northwest146—specifically the way dams there affect the salmon popula-
tion, especially the chinook and bull trout.147 Both Doremus and Melissa
Estes believe this is a cause of concern for a possible takings claim.148
Quoting John Volkman, Doremus stated how dams make life difficult for
the salmon by “slow[ing] migration, heat[ing] up the river, subject[ing]
fish to pressure changes and descaling and affect[ing] food production in
the river.”149 Estes elaborated further and stated that “the reduction in
141 See id. See generally Melissa K. Estes, The Effect of the Federal Endangered Species Act
on State Water Rights, 22 ENVTL. L. 1027 (1992); James R. Rasband, Priority, Probability,
and Proximate Cause: Lessons from Tort Law about Imposing ESA Responsibility for Wildlife
Harm on Water Users and other Joint Habitat Modifiers, 33 ENVTL. L. 595 (Summer 2003).
142 Estes, supra note 141, at 1039.




147 Id. at 376.
148 Id.; Estes, supra note 141, at 1039.
149 Doremus, supra note 136, at 376.
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stream flows caused by water storage behind dams has . . . slow[ed] the
outmigration of juvenile fish into the ocean.”150 Right before stating these
factors, Estes specifically mentioned that any action that modifies a habi-
tat adversely would qualify as a taking.151 These authors’ statements,
taken together, demonstrate their concerns about the likelihood of a suc-
cessful takings claim.
Post-Aransas, however, the authors should not worry as much,
especially because of the way they characterize the salmons’ plight. First,
Estes’ statement that any action that adversely modifies a habitat could
be a taking is clearly not the case in a post-Aransas world because the
whooping cranes’ habitat was clearly modified as the salinity rose, yet
there was no taking.152 Additionally, Doremus’ explanation of the habitat
modification draws a sharp parallel to the many factors that affected the
cranes.153 Estes’ and Doremus’ concerns demonstrate their belief that the
dam is clearly the proximate cause of the harm even though it affects all
those other aspects, because the habitat is modified.154 Post-Aransas,
however, it could be argued that they should not be concerned about this
because the court will not focus on the fact that the habitat was modified,
but rather to the extent the habitat was modified prior to a direct harm
to the endangered species, and therefore find proximate cause lacking.
Concern for water is a problem in the West, and it is understand-
able the state agencies as well as citizens are concerned that their water
rights will be overruled by the ESA in favor of protecting endangered
species. It seems that this concern may have played a part in the Aransas
decision, but because the court of appeals took the approach they did,
they went beyond protecting the state’s water rights and negatively affec-
ted the protection the ESA provides to endangered species. The Aransas
opinion could be used in future cases to make the chain of causation
longer than necessary and therefore find no taking. Cases involving the
diversion of water obviously have more factors in play than a person just
shooting an endangered animal, but that does not mean there is no
proximate cause, especially when the ESA provides a way for legal in-
direct takings.
150 Estes, supra note 141, at 1039.
151 Id.
152 Aransas Project v. Shaw, 775 F.3d 641, 647 (5th Cir. 2014).
153 Doremus, supra note 136, at 376 (comparing to the Aransas reasoning it could look
like this: (1) dams are constructed, (2) dams heat up the river, (3) pressure in the river
changes, (4) food production in the river goes down, (5) salmon are harmed).
154 Id.; Estes, supra note 141, at 1039.
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III. THE CORRECT WAY TO APPROACH PROXIMATE CAUSE IN ESA
TAKINGS CLAIMS AND WHY IT WILL NOT NEGATIVELY IMPACT
THE ABILITY FOR STATES TO USE THEIR WATER
The final Part of this Note briefly details the correct proximate
cause test, which is not a new one, but rather the one the courts have
always used until Aransas. Following the discussion of the proximate
cause test, this section examines how this will not affect states that are
not directly taking endangered species by providing a quick overview of
the Incidental Take Permit (“ITP”).
A. The Proximate Cause Test That Should Be Applied When
Hearing an ESA Takings Claim
This Note discussed the proximate cause analysis of the District
Court in Aransas Project v. Shaw in great detail in Part I, and it is that
proximate cause test that should be applied when hearing a takings
claim.155 A brief explanation of it, again, is that the TCEQ issued water
permits, people with permits withdrew water, and the salinity level rose
in the whooping cranes’ habitat.156 The salinity level rising was a habitat
modification and, due to this habitat modification, whooping cranes were
harmed. The analysis should have stopped there, as it did in the district
court, and the court of appeals should have confirmed the taking because
that is all that is required to be a taking.157 The court of appeals seemed
concerned that this would negatively affect the water rights of the TCEQ
and the people permitted by it and therefore found no taking.158
The dissent by Circuit Judge Prado, in regards to the petition for
rehearing and rehearing en banc, helps illustrate why the Fifth Circuit
incorrectly examined proximate cause and why the lower court was
correct.159 Judge Prado stated that the TCEQ’s water diversions reduced
the freshwater, raising salinity; that the higher salinities affected the
whooping crane habitat; and lastly that whooping cranes died and that
emaciation was the cause of death for some per autopsy reports.160 Judge
Prado continued by comparing this situation to the one in Sierra Club v.
155 See supra Part I.
156 Aransas Project v. Shaw, 930 F. Supp. 2d 716, 725 (S.D. Tex. 2013).
157 16 U.S.C. § 1538.
158 Aransas Project v. Shaw, 775 F.3d 641, 660 (5th Cir. 2014).
159 Aransas Project, 775 F.3d at 329 (Prado, J., dissenting).
160 Id.
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Yeutter.161 He stated that “[i]f the difference between 80- and 100-year-
old trees can support a finding of a ‘take,’ surely a district court—faced
with emaciated crane corpses—could reasonably conclude that a reduc-
tion of freshwater inflows . . . proximately caused a ‘take’ here.”162
The correct proximate cause test is to not overly attenuate the
causal chain because if that happens, then of course it will be hard to
find proximate cause, and that is exactly what the court of appeals did.
No new concerns are raised by applying this version of the proximate
cause test because it is the one that has been used in almost all other
cases as can be seen in Sierra Club v. Yeutter.
B. The Court of Appeals Should Not Be Concerned with the Affect
this Would Have on Water Rights Because the TCEQ Can Apply
for an ITP
The ESA, under section 10(a)(1)(B), allows the incidental taking
of species as long as the taker applies and receives a permit for the ac-
tivity that will result in the taking.163 In order to receive the ITP, the ap-
plicant only has to design, implement, and fund a plan that reduces harm
to the endangered species.164 In fact, the holding of the district court was
for the TCEQ to apply for an ITP.165
The created plan is known as a Habitat Conservation Plan
(“HCP”).166 The HCP needs to include an assessment of the effects the
proposed taking will have, details about how the applicant will lessen and
observe these effects, as well as the necessary funding and procedures
required for this, and why there are no alternative measures other than
the taking.167 Mitigation involves steps that will address the specific
needs of the species by reducing the harm.168 Here, the TCEQ can imple-
ment a program where they monitor the inflows more strictly, set a salinity
161 Id.; see Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429, 432 (5th Cir. 1991).
162 Aransas Project, 775 F.3d at 328 (Prado, J., dissenting).
163 Endangered Species Permits, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., http://www.fws.gov/Midwest
/endangered/permits/hcp/index.html [https://perma.cc/7LCS-S5BT] (last visited Mar. 27,
2016) [hereinafter Endangered Species Permits].
164 Id.
165 Aransas Project v. Shaw, 930 F. Supp. 2d 716, 789 (S.D. Tex. 2013).
166 Endangered Species Permits, supra note 163.
167 Endangered Species Permits: Fact Sheet, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., http://www.fws
.gov/Midwest/endangered/permits/hcp/hcp_wofactsheet.html [https://perma.cc/3K2Z-YAF6]
(last visited Mar. 27, 2016).
168 Id.
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level limit, and adjust the amount of water that can be taken out if the
salinity level starts to rise too high.
CONCLUSION
The court of appeals found that the TCEQ’s issuance of water per-
mits did not proximately cause the death of the whooping cranes thereby
reversing the lower court’s decision.169 The court of appeals claimed that the
lower court incorrectly applied the proximate cause test;170 however, it was
actually the court of appeals that analyzed proximate cause improperly.
The court of appeals claimed that the causal chain was too attenu-
ated.171 That is wrong. Regarding the causal chain, the TCEQ issued
water permits; the users used the water permits, thereby decreasing
water flow to the whooping cranes habitat; the salinity levels rose; and
the whooping cranes died. By looking at that chain of events, it is clear
that the issuance of permits proximately caused a significant modifica-
tion in the whooping cranes’ habitat that led to their deaths.
The court of appeals also incorrectly found that the TCEQ had no
way of foreseeing the harm issuing water permits could cause to the
Cranes.172 That is also absolutely wrong. Not only was the result actually
foreseeable, it was actually foreseen in the IRPWC.173 The IRPWC clearly
stated that water permits would affect the freshwater inflows and that
those inflows are necessary to the whooping cranes’ critical habitat.174
Because the causal chain is not overly complicated or actually
attenuated and because the reduction of freshwater inflows hurting the
whooping cranes’ habitat was foreseen, the district court’s proximate
cause analysis was correct. If the court of appeal’s analysis is allowed to
persist and becomes a model for other courts, future indirect takings claims
will have a very hard time getting past the proximate cause prong and the
endangered species of the United States will be in a much worse position.
169 Aransas Project v. Shaw, 775 F.3d 641 (5th Cir. 2014).
170 Id. at 645.
171 Id. at 656.
172 Id. at 657.
173 See generally IRPWC, supra note 108.
174 Id. at 21.

